ProFTPD Compromise Report On Sunday, the 28th of November 2010 around 20:00 UTC the main distribution server of the ProFTPD project was compromised. The attackers most likely used an unpatched security issue in the FTP daemon to gain access to the server and used their privileges to replace the source files for ProFTPD 1.3.3c with a version which contained a backdoor. The unauthorized modification of the source code was noticed by Daniel Austin and relayed to the ProFTPD project by Jeroen Geilman on Wednesday, December 1 and fixed shortly afterwards. The fact that the server acted as the main FTP site for the ProFTPD project (ftp.proftpd.org) as well as the rsync distribution server (rsync.proftpd.org) for all ProFTPD mirror servers means that anyone who downloaded ProFTPD 1.3.3c from one of the official mirrors from 2010-11-28 to 2010-12-02 will most likely be affected by the problem. The backdoor introduced by the attackers allows unauthenticated users remote root access to systems which run the maliciously modified version of the ProFTPD daemon. Users are strongly advised to check systems running the affected code for security compromises and compile/run a known good version of the code. To verify the integrity of the source files, use the GPG signatures available on the FTP servers as well on the ProFTPD homepage at: http://www.proftpd.org/md5_pgp.html.
This is where I post snippets of information about Information Technology. It is mostly for my own reference but I hope that others will find it useful and comments are welcome.
Monday, December 06, 2010
[ProFTPD-announce] ProFTPD ftp.proftpd.org compromise
http://marc.info/?l=proftpd-announce&m=129124765606322
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